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Much was at stake in the LM / Deficiencies decision, one of the last but most anticipated
decisions of this judicial year. Two of the thorniest issues of EU constitutional law crossed
their paths: the EU’s reaction to the constitutional crisis in Poland, on the one hand, and the
operation of the European Arrest Warrant under the principle of mutual trust, on the other.
The Court of Justice was called to strike a complex balance between different interests, a
balance that was bound to be controversial.
In my view, it managed to strike this balance in a fairly positive manner. The ruling of July
25 is clearly a step forward compared to the Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev, widely
received with disappointment, including on this blog (see here and here). While it is true
that the operative part of the ruling is not too dissimilar – the execution of a European
Arrest Warrant (EAW) can be suspended in case of systemic deficiencies with the rule of
law, threatening the essence of the right to a fair trial, only after an individual assessment
of the concrete situation of the applicant – the underlying tone and reasoning of the Court
are more convincing. While the ruling was not the defining ‘constitutional moment’[1] that
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some colleagues expected, this moment might be only postponed. The Court made it clear
that ‘red lines’, to use the expression suggested by the first contribution to this symposium,
already exist in European constitutional law, and that it is willing to operationalize them.
The ruling of the Court: explicit and implicit messages
The Court strikes this complex balance combining different techniques and languages.
There are on the one hand the traditional mutual trust arguments: the Court repeats that
mutual trust is a principle of fundamental importance for the Union’s legal order – making a
textbook reference to Opinion 2/13 (this is also repeated in a second decision delivered on
July 25, C-220/18 PPU ML) – and that it can only cease to operate in ‘exceptional
circumstances’. Thus, the Court is not ready to do away with the need for an individual
assessment of the specific and particular conditions of the applicant. At the same time, the
Court gives significant leeway to the national court in ultimately deciding both on the
existence of a systemic deficiency and on the individual assessment. On the basis of the
Court of Justice’s decision, it seems the Irish High Court has sufficient margin to decide
that sufficient guarantees of judicial independence are not present in the LM case, also
considering that the case has now evidently become a political one (see also the comments
delivered after the ruling by the Polish Minister of Justice). Hence, the re-affirmation of the
mutual trust doctrine is balanced by the more implicit recognition of a wide margin of
discretion for the national court.
In a second sense, the orthodox mutual trust arguments are balanced by a series of quite
explicit signals that the Court considers the situation in Poland problematic. These
paragraphs serve as a reminder on the existence of red lines in European
constitutionalism. One of these messages, and also an important difference between the
ruling and the Opinion of the Advocate General, is the emphasis on the concept of judicial
independence. The Court holds that judicial independence ‘forms part of the essence of the
fundamental rights to a fair trial’ (para 48), which seems to mean that any breach of the
requirement should be considered a breach of the essence of the right. This is clearly a
higher standard than that requested by the Advocate General, who argued that a lack of
independence would only breach the essence of the right (and amount to ‘flagrant denial of
justice’) ‘if it so serious that it destroys the fairness of the trial’ (para 93 of the Opinion).
A second signal is given in para 61, where the Court gives instruction to the referring court
on the materials to be evaluated in determining the existence of systemic deficiencies. The
Court affirms that the Commission’s reasoned proposal under Article 7(1) ‘is particularly
relevant’ for that assessment. If we also consider the long summary of the Commission’s
document in the first part of the ruling (paras 18-21), there are reasons to believe that the
Court shares much of the concerns expressed by the Commission. And finally, the several
references to the decision C-64/16 ASJP are an important message as well. In that ruling,
the Court intentionally expanded the reach of EU law – specifically, of Article 19 TEU – to
‘the fields covered by EU law’, and it is now even more evident that it did so with the
intention to assess the Polish judiciary reform in the future. If the Court had not stretched
the interpretation of EU law in this manner, the most problematic profiles of the reforms,
including those on the Supreme Court, would have arguable fallen outside the scope of EU
law. The fact that the Court exercises caution in exercising this newly acquired (and self-
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conferred) power of review is, in my view, a positive sign of self-restraint (for a different
view, see Mattias Wendel’s contribution to this debate). But there will soon be further
opportunities to exercise these powers.
Future constitutional moments?
Generally, the framing of the LM case did not make it easy for the Court to take a bold
position on Poland. The infringement actions on the Law on Ordinary Courts (see C-
192/18, Commission v Poland, pending) and on the Law on the Supreme Court seem
much more promising opportunities for giving real bite to the red lines, or in other words for
determining the boundaries of the Union’s constitutional project.[2]
In the first place, the perspective through which the LM case reached the Court cannot be
forgotten. The gist of the case was the protection of individual fundamental rights and the
interpretation of the EAW Framework Decision; not the legislative changes operated by the
Polish Parliament and the rule of law situation in Poland in general. Of course there are
crucial connections between the two facets, but the applicant and the referring court asked
the Court of Justice precisely how the rule of law situation in Poland reflected on the
individual position of the applicant and on his right to a fair trial. The referring court even
took for granted the existence of a breach of the rule of law in Poland. Thus, the
substantive situation, i.e. the reforms undertook by the Polish government, were certainly
crucial as a context and background of the decision, but not the core concern of the Court.
On the other hand, in the infringement procedures, the key concern of the Court will be
whether the new legislation complies with the Article 19 TEU and in particular the
requirement of judicial independence it is deemed to include (see again the ruling in ASJP).
In other words, the attention will specifically be on the value of the rule of law as ‘specified’
by Article 19 TEU. Moreover, there will be no, or at least less, conflicting interests to
safeguard, such as protecting the smooth functioning of the EAW or generally the
effectiveness of EU law.
The second point relates to the consequences and effects of a possible ruling. Taking a
strict stance in LM would have meant for the Court to assess the (potential) independence
of all Polish courts, and possibly removing the Member State and its courts from the
European legal sphere. I doubt that this would have ultimately been beneficial for the
protection of EU values and the rule of law in the country: the Court would have lost its
natural allies, the domestic courts; the reaction at the political level would have been
extremely harsh, with further attacks to the Court legitimacy and authority; and finally Polish
(EU) citizens might have been deprived of the protection offered by the Union legal system.
In the infringement actions, the rulings will be much more targeted and precise. The
assessment will concern the pieces of legislation adopted and their alleged negative effects
on judicial independence. If the Court finds a breach of EU law, Polish authorities will be
forced to take measures in order to remedy the breach – in this sense, it will be important
that the Court, learning from previous Hungarian mistakes, makes clear that ‘symbolic and
creative’ forms of compliance[3] would not be acceptable – and if they fail to do so, the
procedure of Article 260 TFEU would become available.
The importance of the political game
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The two pending infringement actions are thus even more central to the current EU rule of
law crisis and may give a better contribution to addressing the concrete problems on the
ground. And so are the proceedings under Article 7 TEU. As frustrating as it might be for us
lawyers to wait for the Council and Parliament’s deliberations, it should not be forgotten
that the EU treaties themselves leave space for the ‘political game’ when it comes to the
protection of EU values. Most importantly, they do so when they exclude the Court from
substantive deliberations under Article 7 TEU (see Article 269 TFEU).
Hence, while it is true that the Court cannot simply leave all responsibilities to political
authorities, it should not completely replace them and the procedures created by the
Treaties. Furthermore, the political game is clearly on, as showed by the hearing before the
Council a few weeks ago: it would be wrong to say that the Article 7 has already proven
unworkable and that the Council has failed to take up its responsibilities. Both the decisions
under Article 7 TEU and the future rulings in the pending infringement actions will therefore
be crucial constitutional moments for the Union. The showdown some were already
excepting in the LM decision is merely postponed.
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